Capitalism is in the throes o f a profound crisis deriving from the social changes accom panying the evolution o f technology and its contradictions. T h ese changes find expression in dynam ic disequiübria which affect th e in tern al econom ies o f both the cen tral and the p erip h eral countries, as well as cen tre-periphery rela tions. An analysis o f these disequilibria constitutes the nucleus o f the article (sections n and m ), which then puts forw ard consid erations relating to the crisis o f conventional econom ic ideas (section iv) and ends by ou tlinin g a policy to grapple with the cu rren t crisis. F ro m the standpoint o f the periphery, correction o f the extern al disequilibrium calls fo r wariness to w ards recom m en d ation s th at en cou rage trade and Financial "o p enn ess", and fo r p aram ou nt em phasis on im p ort substitution at the subregional and regional levels and on th e estab lish m en t o f a new overall fram ew ork fo r ren egotiation o f the external debt, in volving a consid erable extension o f m aturity periods and red u ction o f interest rates. T h e in tern al disequilibrium , in its turn, cannot be o v ercom e unless the ap propriation , accum ulation and d istrib u tion o f incom e are radically transform ed by m eans o f m acroecon om ic regulation o f the global su r plus th ro u g h a d em ocratic process in which all social groups take part, in particular those which have been left w ithout a sh are in the fruits o f developm ent. T h is is a problem that both in theory and above all in prac tice is extrem ely hard to solve. B u t there is no other way o f facing up to the crisis, since the play o f m arket laws and a purely m onetary policy have shown them selves im p o tent to tackle the dilem m as o f today with lasting success.
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T h e in tern al disequilibrium , in its turn, cannot be o v ercom e unless the ap propriation , accum ulation and d istrib u tion o f incom e are radically transform ed by m eans o f m acroecon om ic regulation o f the global su r plus th ro u g h a d em ocratic process in which all social groups take part, in particular those which have been left w ithout a sh are in the fruits o f developm ent. T h is is a problem that both in theory and above all in prac tice is extrem ely hard to solve. A global view o f the crisis 1.
The vigour o f capitalism an d the weakening o f its dynamic force W e are living through a worldwide crisis of capitalism. T he evolution o f technology and its effects on the structure o f society, along with its contradictions, have brought with them new and complex phenomena which had never before occurred in the development of the system and now go beyond the bounds o f the theories formulated in the second half o f the nineteenth century. T he capitalism of today is in fact very different from that of the past, both in the cen tres and in the periphery, which are integral parts o f one and the same system. This crisis in the Latin A m erican sphere can only be un derstood within the global context of the system.
A fter rates of development so high as to be unprecedented in the history of capitalism, the reversal of the trend is a m atter of grave concern. It seems unlikely that these rates will return in what remains o f this decade or even beyond it. Unemployment obstinately persists, despite cer tain improvements, and there has unavoidably been a regression in social services and at best a postponement o f the hope of raising the real income of broad strata o f the population.
W hat is happening in capitalism? Is it that, after enormous capital accumulation, especially in the centres, the notable capacity for expansion which prevailed until a short time ago has been lost? Far from it; I believe that this crisis is rather a consequence o f the vigour o f capitalism, of its ceaseless technological innovations, o f its proved ability to extend material well-being to great mas ses o f people.
T h e mutations in the structure of society and in power relations which accompany the evolu tion o f tech n o lo g y , cou p led with the con tradictions arising from its ambivalence, are driv ing present-day capitalism into disequilibria un known in those earlier times.
In this paper we shall mention two basic disequilibria which jeopardize the economic sur plus and consequently the accumulation of re productive capital, and end by plunging the sys tem into crisis: the internal disequilibrium with its adverse effect on the rate of accumulation, detrimentally to the multiplication of employ m ent, productivity and income (whence stems the internal vulnerability of the process), and the imbalance in relations between the centres and the periphery, which the latter tries to correct through the exp ort o f manufactures, thus in turn giving rise to e x te rn a l vulnerability o f the econom ic surplus.
T o this must be added a phenomenon of great im portance: the elimination of the gold standard which characterized capitalism in the past. This standard, with all its faults, imposed a m onetary discipline, which does not exist in con tem porary capitalism, subject as it is to all the ups-and-downs o f the dollar in its double role of national and international currency. I am far from claiming that my explanation o f the crisis is exhaustive. I merely stress the influence o f technology and its contradictions. This is a presentation which, being schematic, omits special cases and circumstantial factors.
The internal vulnerability o f the surplus
I have referred in the first place to the accumula tion o f reproductive capital. This process is based on the capacity o f certain higher groups in the social structure to appropriate and retain a major part of the fruits of the technical progress re flected in the steady increase of productivity. This is the m eaning of the economic surplus. A meaning eminently dynamic, since the surplus has always been and still is the primary source of reproductive accumulation.
It is a m atter not only of the appropriation of a lion's share o f the fruits of technical progress but also o f its persistent retention in these higher groups. T h e development of capitalism has not been characterized by the social diffusion of these fruits through a fall in prices correlative with the rise in productivity; in the interplay of the m arket only a partial distribution to the labour force takes place. This has had highly im p o rtan t internal consequences for the dy namics of capitalism, one of which is the present crisis, since the surplus has become vulnerable to the detrim ent of the system's capacity to expand.
In the system's past, the surplus seemed in vulnerable. And now we see that this was only a phase in the development of the system or, so to speak, of a historical category. The labour force was passive and entirely subject to the rule of market laws; it did not dispute the power of the advantaged groups to appropriate a large share of the fruits of technical progress. Nor was the State moved by considerations of redistribution; as far as the free play of market forces was con cerned, it was a laissez-faire State.
T he progressive strengthening of the redis tributive power of the labour force and of the State is an expression of the changes which occur in the social structure and power relations as technology evolves and penetrates that structure, and democratization gains momentum.
Thus there develops a distribution struggle which ends by weakening the growth rate of the surplus and with the passage o f time leads to the crisis of the system. But this is not all: the evolu tion o f technology brings with it great con tradictions too. Among these are, on the one hand, the technological innovations which in crease the actual quantity of goods and services themselves, and, on the other, those which di versify them m ore and m ore, creating new de signs or new types of goods and services. And all this is fostered by the mass communication and social propaganda techniques.
T hus to the weakening of the growth rate of the surplus by the distribution struggle we must add the persistent incentive to consume at the expense of the dynamics of the system. Hence arises a growing tendency to disequilibrium be tween the rate of expenditure (including nonreproductive investment) and the rate of repro ductive capital accumulation. And this has an adverse effect on the growth rate of employ ment, income and productivity.
T h e dynamics of the system depends, then, on the growth of the surplus and this, in its turn, is based on social inequality. And when the evolu tion of the system tries to correct this inequality, the end result is internal vulnerability of the sur plus and a decline in the rate of reproductive a c c u m u la tio n , with s e rio u s d yn am ic co n sequences. Obviously, if technical progress in creases production, its purpose is to increase con sumption. It is not there that the root of the problem lies, but in the tendency of consumption to grow faster than accumulation.
The external vulnerability o f the surplus
T h e surplus used to be invulnerable thanks also to the passivity of the primary-producer coun tries. Because of the very dynamics of the system th e se c o u n tr ie s had n o t yet ach iev ed in dustrialization. This was the origin of the periph ery in the global system of capitalism.
With the fragmentation of the periphery, which had no dynamics o f its own, large masses o f its population were left on the sidelines of development. But the periphery is becoming in dustrialized and has succeeded in exporting m anufactures based on relatively less advanced techniques, which com pete with those of the cen tres, mainly thanks to lower prices. This creates an incipient external vulnerability of the surplus which, although not yet a major factor, aggravate the effects of the internal vulnerability.
Faced with this external vulnerability, which is only just em erging, the centres resort to impos ing restrictions, in one way or another, on im ports from the periphery. And they deprive this latter of the resources needed to satisfy its grow ing dem and for imports of diversified and tech nically advanced goods which it cannot yet pro duce owing to the tune-lag in its industrialization or to the lack of natural resources for the inputs of such goods. In this way the trend towards extern al dynam ic disequilibrium is superim p o se d on th e e ffe c ts o f th e in te rn a l dis equilibrium o f the periphery, thus reducing the speed o f its development.
T h e fact is that with a productivity lower than that of the centres, the periphery tends to imitate their patterns o f consumption, especially in re spect of technically advanced goods. The Latin Am erican countries are anything but austere, so that the trend towards internal imbalance is more pronounced than it was in the centres at a similar stage o f their development. T he two disequilibria are closely linked.
The waste o f productive resources
Neither the centres, nor much less the periph ery, have found a solution to the internal dynam ic disequilibrium, which ultimately culminates in a new type o f inflation that did not arise in the capitalism o f the past and which cannot be hand led now with the m onetary instrument. The monetary instrument is an anachronism: it pro vokes o r accentuates unemployment without correcting the basic factors of disequilibrium. So it is not surprising to come across the peculiar argum ent that an appreciable unemployment coefficient must be maintained in order to lessen the distribution struggle; in other words, to re vert to those times when the labour force was passive and the State unconcerned. Could this be called optimum use of productive resources?
Again, the external defence of the surplus by the centres, by the application of all sorts of res trictions on imports from the periphery, is an other counterproductive method of tackling this problem, since it deprives centres and peripheral countries alike o f the acknowledged advantage o f international trade.
It is not just the crisis of the global system of capitalism that is in question. It is also a crisis of ideas and forms o f action which have manifestly been overtaken by events.
The macroeconomic regulation o f the system
It is not possible to retrace our steps and return to a passive labour force and a laissez-faire State in ord er to restore the invulnerability of the sur plus. N or yet to diffuse the surplus in such a way that the fruits of technical progress are socially distributed through a fall in prices. Capitalism has never functioned like that. T h ere has always been a surplus; the praxis of the system has not accorded with conventional theories, however much their validity may have been asserted.
T o solve the problem the primary requisite is that the surplus perform as effectively as possible its dynamic role, which is to step up the rate of accumulation and employ with increasing pro ductivity and ever-rising incomes the increment o f the labour force as well as the manpower which has been relegated with lower productivity to the bottom o f the social structure. Social use of the economic surplus is essential.
This calls for macroeconomic regulation of the rate of expenditure and the rate of accumula tion; in other words, we must not assign to pres ent consumption the grain which should be set aside as seed for the expansion of production.
Is the surplus to be raised so as to increase its accumulation by the social groups at present favoured under the system? O r should accumu lation be concentrated in the hands of the State? O r are we to allow the labour force a share in the process, thereby fomenting the social diffusion o f capital? These are questions o f fundamental im portance for the transformation of the system if dynamic efficacy and distributive equity are to be fully achieved.
6, T he prim ordial role o f the market
It is im p erative to raise productivity if this transform ation is to be economically and socially successful. B ut it is not enough to strengthen the rate o f reproductive accumulation. It is equally essential to take full advantage of the productive potential o f capital and labour, both through en trepreneurial initiative, and through the increas ing skills o f the labour force, whose contribution to production is also indispensable. O f primary im portance in all this is the role of economic incentive in every participant in this process. I f the transform ation o f the system is to be tackled with vigour there must be a rational com bination o f the social use o f the surplus and the positive elements o f the market, simultaneously correcting the negative factors stemming from the contradictions o f technology and promoting entrepreneurial competition.
T his crisis of capitalism is a crisis of accumu lation and not o f the m arket, despite the negative elements and flaws in its operation.
7.

Crisis o f capitalism an d crisis o f socialism in practice
Capitalism is centripetal in the play of market forces. Its dynamics is based on the concentration in private hands o f a large part of the fruits of technical progress in the form o f surplus. But the mutations o f the social structure help to give im petus to dem ocratization and to the pro gressive evolution of individual liberties, among them entrepreneurial freedom and the role of incentive, which have such a marked influence on the steady stepping-up of productivity.
This process and the dynamics of the system itself bring about likewise a centrifugal trend to wards diffusion o f the fruits in question which ends by jeopardizing the growth of the surplus. This is the source o f the crisis o f accumulation and distribution. D em ocratization requires, therefore, that this process be transformed.
In socialism in p ra ctic e the surplus is appropriated by the State and retained in its h ands, a situation which invests those who dominate the system with invincible economic and political power. By virtue o f this concentra tion, decisions on what is to be produced and what consumed are taken at the summit of the sy stem , d e trim e n ta lly -as its lead ers in creasingly recognize-to freedom of initiative on the part of enterprises and to productivity in centives, with the result that the dynamic role of the surplus is affected. T h e crisis of socialism in practice is, then, a crisis of productivity.
Accordingly, a question of vital importance comes to the fore. T o what extent would a de mocratization process which, apart from its in trinsic significance, boosts entrepreneurial free dom and the play of incentives, be compatible with this concentration o f power at the summit of the system?
The vicissitudes o f the dollar and the crisis
T h e tendencies towards disequilibrium arising from the evolution o f the system are aggravated by the fiscal and monetary indiscipline of the leading dynamic centre of capitalism. The in ternational consequences of all this are closely linked with the double role o f the dollar as national and international currency. We cannot conclude this preliminary overview of the crisis without referring to so vital an aspect of the sub ject.
It is hard to produce gold. Herein lay the relatively stabilizing virtue o f the gold standard, notwithstanding its flaws. T he liquidation of the gold standard helped to give the dollar its pres ent role as international currency. The dollar is produced with no difficulty at all, which implies conferring on the producer country the privilege o f creating it, and at the same time the responsi bility for doing so correctly. T he reform of the international monetary system poses, then, a problem much more pro found than the reconditioning o f a mechanism. It is a problem of power relations on the in ternational plane.
II
The trend towards internal dynamic disequilibrium and the inflationary process In the play o f market laws, enterprises re q u ire p e rso n n e l to co p e with the h ig h erproductivity technical innovations incorporated by new capital investment. This demand mainly favours those groups which possess the increas ing skills required by technology (including those concerned with the more and more complex organization of the production processes). The supply is naturally limited in these groups and the labour force concerned has the capacity to share spontaneously in the productivity incre ment. Lower down in the scale of skills, however, the supply of labour becomes relatively abun dant. Thus, as this labour force is employed in new technical layers of increasing productivity, the comparatively plentiful supply precludes a corresponding rise in its remuneration.
We have described as economic surplus that part of the productivity increment which, owing to this regressive competition, is transferred to the labour force only partially or not at all, and thus remains in the hands of the owners of the means o f production.
Accordingly the generation of the surplus is affected by market laws (manpower supply and demand) and by the heterogeneity of the social structure. It should be noted that the surplus, which ultimately derives from technical prog ress, comprises profit, interest on capital and land rent. It must also be stressed that the surplus is augm ented by profits which originate not di rectly in technical progress but in frequent de viations from m arket laws, such as internal or in tern ation al restrictions on com petition, in addition to inflationary swelling of the surplus. All this helps to exacerb ate the distribution struggle.
In this structural heterogeneity the distribu tion o f pow er is o f vital im p o rta n ce. T h e appropriation of the surplus by the privileged social groups is based on the economic power to do so, conferred by their ownership of the means o f production, and the political power to protect the process. This is not to deny the importance of individual aptitudes in the generation of the sur plus. Similarly, differences in social power carry considerable weight in the acquisition of the di verse skills required by technical progress in the production o f goods and services. And this social power is combined with the aptitudes exhibited by individuals in the vast gamut of activities.
Be that as it may, the intensity of the genera tion o f the surplus depends, on the one hand, on the rate of accumulation of reproductive capital which is invested successively in new technical layers, and on the other, on the labour force which remains in lower-productivity layers and on the growth rate o f the labour force.
Such, in very schematic terms, is the nature o f th e a ccu m u la tio n p rocess based on the econom ic surplus. T h e techniques which in creasingly raise productivity generate in their turn the accumulation of reproductive capital, which makes it possible to incorporate new tech niques and increase productivity: this is the dynamic sequence of the system based on the surplus.
2.
The In the earlier days of capitalism the power of the groups obtaining the lion's share of the fruits of technical progress was predominant. Howev er, the structural mutations manifest themselves, inter alia, in a change in power relations. Thus, with the advance of democratization in the grow ing urban conglomerates which are characteristic o f capitalism, and in which the structural muta tions of employment are most in evidence, the trade-union and political power o f the labour force sprouts and develops, although with great disparities, since the labour force is far from be ing homogeneous, as are also the social groups favoured by the surplus. Be that as it may, this twofold power obstructs the power of appropria tion o f the surplus which was formerly the un disputed prerogative of the owners of the means o f production. In this way the labour force pushes up the rate o f its private consumption, along with its social consumption via the State. In other words, the labour force tends to raise its real income above what is due to it in accordance with market laws and the dynamic need to in crease the surplus and with it the rate of accumu lation.
T h e same effect occurs when the State, in addition to this and other forms of redistribu tion in favour o f the labour force, expands its functions to the detriment of the growth rate of the surplus, in so far as these do not contribute to the productivity increment. T he State plays its part either by increasing the taxes and charges which fall on the labour force and which the latter strives to recoup, or by taxing the surplus. In either case the consequences are much the same.
T h e changes in power relations have great dynamic importance. In the structural stages in which the power o f the higher strata is pre eminent, there is nothing to hamper the growth o f the surplus except cyclical or accidental fac tors: the labour force lacks redistributive power and the State is unconcerned with redistribution. T h e surplus is invulnerable. This is not the case when the aforesaid changes in power relations supervene and are intensified.
T h e significance of these changes cannot be understood without probing into the social sig nificance o f the surplus. T h e surplus is a clear expression o f a basic distributive inequality. And
in the evolution o f the system the labour force tries to correct this inequality by raising its wages above what is in keeping with the play of market forces. In its turn the State, impelled by the polit ical power of labour, concedes increasing social advantages and employs manpower which, ow ing to insufficient accumulation and other fac tors, cannot find employment in the open m ar ket. T hus attempts are made to correct the es sential inequality o f the system.
A distinction must be drawn, however, be tween this social objective and the means em ployed to achieve it: means which sooner or later lead to the crisis o f the system.
The contradictions o f technology
This crisis is a manifestation not only of the vul nerability o f the surplus but also of the way in which it is used, that is, of the proportion of the surplus and of income in general that is allocated to reproductive accumulation. Here we are up against the contradictions of technology. What are these contradictions? They are of different types.
Let us look first at those which continually stimulate consumption. While there are technical innovations operating to raise the quantity of goods, others supervene which arouse consumer aspirations at a faster rate. These latter are those techniques which in different ways provoke an increase in demand through the incessant di versification of the same goods and services and the creation o f new ones. All this is due to the portentous evolution of techniques of propaga tion o f these consum er aspirations and of com munication techniques.
T h e increase in consumption which thus occurs first manifests itself in the upper strata, both in co n su m er exp en d itu re and in nonreproductive investments of a recreational and ostentatious character, and subsequently in the lower social strata, in proportion to the growth of labour's redistributive power, although naturally with diminished force. Thus these diverse forms o f private and social consumption continue to appear one after another, no one type benefiting at the expense o f the rest, but at the expense of the rate o f accumulation. T o this must be added State expenditure and investment, which, even if in part reproductive, affect the surplus of the enterprises.
In the old days of capitalism the social effica cy of the accumulation process depended basical ly on the prevailing degree of austerity; that is, on the proportion of the economic surplus which was devoted to reproductive accumulation instead o f to consum ption. T h e m ore intensive the accumulation, the deeper was the penetration of productive technology which raised the pro ductivity and income of all the strata until it reached the lowest groups.
However this may have occurred in those past times, it is certain that today the growth of consumption, stimulated by diversification, is a considerable obstacle to capital accumulation, the consequences of which are manifest in the trend towards dynamic disequilibrium which characterizes contemporary capitalism in gen eral.
In underlining the influence of diversifica tion on the rate of accumulation we cannot omit to mention the Keynesian thesis on the tendency o f the system to generate an excess of saving, which is a very different thesis from that of dynamic disequilibrium set forth in these pages. W hen Keynes began to write his general theory, at a time o f worldwide depression, diversification had not attained the dimensions which it later reached. It was therefore conceivable that the relatively slow growth of consumption would cre ate an imbalance between the rate of expenditure and that o f reproductive accumulation opposite to that which was to appear later in the system. How is it possible, then, despite Keynes' acute intellectual insight, to suppose that he could anti cipate the momentous technological innovations which caused a flood of private and social con sumption to the detriment of the system's saving and its own dynamics?
In addition to the contradictions between the techniques which increase the quantity of goods and those which diversify them, there are other contradictions which we shall go on to mention next. I refer in the first place to the evergrowing contradiction resulting from the ambivalence of those techniques which raise productivity but at the same time signify pollution of the environ m ent and irresponsible exploitation of non renewable natural resources. The effort to cor rect this ecological damage generally implies the investment o f m ore capital per unit o f produc tion, and the same happens with the results of scientific and technological advances in relation to population growth.
The dynamic disequilibrium in peripheral capitalism
T h e dynamics o f the system rests, then, on the stru ctu ra l inequality w herein the surplus is generated. And in the course of development this surplus becomes vulnerable, prejudicially to the intensity o f reproductive accumulation. T h e foregoing explanations concerning the vulnerability o f the surplus and o f the accumula tion process in the course of structural change relate to capitalism in general. It is very im portant, however, to note the great differences, in relation to the centres, which occur in pe ripheral capitalism, owing mainly to the time-lag in its development and to its eminently imitative nature.
In contem porary capitalism there is a very pronounced structural heterogeneity in the pe riphery compared with that of the centres, which has been diminishing in the course of develop ment. Thus, in the periphery, notwithstanding the differences between countries, there is still a very great diversity o f technical layers and pro ductivity. And the proportion of the labour force in lower-productivity layers is considerable, as well as population growth. Consequently, as technical layers o f high productivity are in corporated, a bigger proportion of the fruits of increased productivity than in the centres is not tran sferred to the labour force employed in those and is therefore retained in the enterprises in the form o f surplus under the sway of market laws.
If the capitalism o f the periphery were aus tere, this larger relative surplus would permit a high rate o f reproductive accumulation, giving greater impetus to the dynamics of the system. B ut this is not the case, and the marked tendency to imitate the centres' advanced patterns of con sumption is a serious obstacle to reproductive accum ulation. High consumption and invest m ent o f a recreational and ostentatious character in the privileged consum er society of the upper strata: this is the dominant feature o f the social structure o f the periphery. And as the labour force improves its income, both through market laws and through its redistributive power, it naturally tends to increase its private and social consumption, which is superimposed on the priv ileged expenditure of the upper strata. This redistributive power manifests itself much ear lier than it did in the corresponding stage of structural change in the centres. In other words, the tim e-lag in developm ent and in the in corporation o f technical progress does not sig nify a lag in imitation o f the patterns o f consump tion: quite the contrary.
With regard to State expenditure, its volume tends to be relatively higher than that o f the centres at similar stages of their development. This hypertrophy of the State is a factor in the lower rate o f accumulation, although part of the State expenditure and investment contributes in one way or another to a rise in productivity. This is the reason why the trend towards an internal dynamic imbalance between the rate of expenditure and that of reproductive accumula tion, accentuated by the high rate o f population growth, appears prematurely in the periphery in comparison with what happened in the centres at similar stages o f their structural evolution, and why the social inflation stemming from this phe nomenon has also occurred earlier and also ac quired much greater dimensions.
The retention o f the surplus
Why does this dynamic disequilibrium manifest itself in a new type of inflation which had never made its appearance before? Put another way: why does this imbalance not manifest itself sim ply in a slackening o f the rate o f employment, productivity and income, i.e., in a reduced dynam ics o f the system without the em ergence of inflation? This question cannot be answered sat isfactorily without elucidation of another mat ter o f unquestionable im portance. We have exp lain ed above that the econom ic surplus stemmed from the heterogeneity of the social stru ctu re in which the power o f the higher strata, which own the greater part of the means o f p rod u ction , enables them to appropriate a large part o f the fruits of the growing pro ductivity of the system. In that case, if the surplus is appropriated in this way, why is there no tendency for competition among enterprises to be diffused socially through a fall in prices?
This does not happen, however. If this mys tery has not been cleared up it is perhaps due to the line o f reasoning relating to the individual enterprise. If there is a surplus in an enterprise owing to greater productivity, competition will push up the production of this enterprise or of others and eliminate the surplus: all that would rem ain would be the rem uneration of the en trepreneurs. If this happens in an individual en terprise, why does not the same thing occur in the enterprises as a whole? Why is the argument relating to the microeconomy not transposed to the m acroeconom y? W e shall attem pt to explain this. T o increase output the individual entrepreneur has to raise em ployment in the course of the production pro cess, and the additional income thus generated filters through the whole economy without per ceptibly increasing demand for the goods man ufactured by this enterprise.
In contrast, if the enterprises are taken as a whole, the growth of the production in process ch aracteristic o f the dynamics of the system generates an increase in income which results in an increase in global market demand. This in crease in dem and created by the growth of the production o f goods in process which will enter the m arket later on is what permits the absorp tion o f the productivity increment incorporated in the finished goods that constitute current supply. If this were not so, demand would be insufficient to absorb the productivity incre ment, thus causing a fall in prices.
But in the growth of production time is of great im portance. In effect, the incomes which are paid out in the production in process in order to obtain finished goods later on generate an increase in demand as a result of the additional employm ent and the rise in wages in the play of m arket forces. This increase in demand does not wait for the subsequent appearance o f the re spective finished goods, but is directed at the goods finished today, so to speak, without prices being brought down by the corresponding pro ductivity increm ent. H ence the productivity in crem ent remains in the enterprises in the form of surplus and is added to that which had been generated before.
In fact, the surplus is generated bit by bit in the different layers of production in process. In this way the global surplus is built up, which is incorporated into global demand together with the income corresponding to the labour force. Consequently, in the course of the growth of global production in the system there are two variables o f prime importance: on the one hand, the increment in demand deriving from the in come corresponding to the increase in the pro duction in process of future goods, and, on the other, the productivity increment in the supply of current goods.
Social inflation
It is obvious that if this increase in demand deriv ing from income were to exceed the productivity increm ent in the production in process, prices would tend to rise.
H ere the monetary authority plays its part, since it is responsible for the creation of money with which the enterprises have to pay the in crease in wages. Such is the regulatory function which is entrusted to it. T he evolution of capital ism has in this case also brought about major changes in the fulfilment of this task.
W hat is it that ensures equivalence between the rise in demand in a determined period and the increase in the supply o f goods existing in the same period, augmented by the greater pro ductivity? We cannot answer this question with out a brief reference to the cycle, which is the growth pattern of the capitalist economy. In the ascending phase of the cycle the growth of de mand tends to exceed that of supply owing to the rise in employment and wages in the play of market forces. Hence prices go up and the sur plus increases more than productivity: these are increases o f a transitory nature. T he central banks, responsible for monetary stability, try to prevent the rise in prices from exceeding mod erate limits in order to palliate, if not ward off, internal and external pressures in the system. W hen these limits are overstepped, the banks will follow a restrictive policy which curbs the ascend ing phase and provokes a cyclical downturn by reversing the earlier movements.
A descent might also occur through the evolution o f the phenomenon itself. Thus when the enterprises, instead o f using a part of the surplus in accum ulation which is gradually soaked up in the cyclical process, allocate it to paym ent o f income in the production in process, as a result o f which there is no corresponding increase in dem and to absorb the productivity increm ent, a fall in prices occurs.
In my earlier writings on this subject I have referred to another important aspect which I merely mention here in passing so as not to com plicate the issue. T h e increase in income deriving from production in process is not all immediately transform ed into demand for Final goods, but is diverted towards services. When the cyclical de scent occurs, this demand returns to goods and contributes to the reactivation o f the economy, which brings about a new upturn.
T h e m onetary authority has a difficult role to play. It has gradually acquired experience in the task o f regulation, not without failures as in the G reat Depression, which originated in the main dynamic centre of capitalism. The Key nesian innovation is explained by this failure in regulatory action.
B e that as it may, in contem porary capital ism, in which the labour force has considerable trade-union and political power, and the State no longer adopts a laissez-faire policy, the monetary authority encounters problems which it had nev er had to face before.
In the capitalism o f the past, when through market forces or incipient trade-union power wages rose beyond the level determined by the m arket and prices went up, the monetary author ity had sufficient power to bring wages down again o r even prevent them from rising by means of restriction. M onetary regulation was effective.
But in m odern capitalism a veritable con frontation o f powers has arisen: on the one hand, the redistributive power of the labour force; on the other, the regulatory power of the monetary authority. I f wages rise through trade-union power and the monetary authority is firm in applying its policy o f restraint, enterprises will not be able to raise both employment and wages.
They will therefore be forced to sacrifice the form er in ord er to pay the increase in wages. This raises their costs and prices. An inflationary spiral follows, together with unemployment.
T h e m onetary authority has considerable theoretical support for this policy: the support of the conventional theories which consider that trade-union power represents a violation of m ar ket laws, just as does exaggerated growth of the State. This theoretical support in its turn coin cides in the main with the interests of the domi nant groups. And if the monetary authority tena ciously persists in the severity o f this policy, a time will come when the volume of unemploy ment will end by destroying trade-union power.
In previous articles we have enlarged on these topics. T he growth of demand can also derive from the abuse of credit directed towards consumption or investment, i.e., patterns of ear lier capitalism which are reproduced in current capitalism and increase the inflationary spiral. Similarly, the fiscal deficit tends to soar, as is g e n e ra lly a sign o f in te rn a l d yn am ic dis equilibrium. Sometimes an attempt is made to tackle it by counterproductive credit restraint, particularly when trade-union power is strong. H ere we confine ourselves to a brief account of how the mechanism of retention operates, and how, when it exceeds its bounds to the detriment of the surplus, the monetary authority attempts to correct it at considerable economic and social cost: the cost o f the recovery of the surplus through unemployment.
If that were a final solution of the problem of dynamic disequilibrium this cost of a restrictive monetary policy might perhaps be justified. But this is not so. T h ere is a need for other forms of macroeconomic regulation of the system. O f course the employment of force by the State to defeat trade-union power has also failed to solve this problem, as Latin American ex perience shows. And its political cost, in addition to its economic and social cost, is enormous.
III
Centre-periphery relations and their trend towards disequilibrium
.The time-lag in peripheral development
In earlier pages we have attributed a decisive influence on the dynamics of development to the fact that the part of the fruits of technical prog ress which was not transferred to the labour force was not reflected in a fall in prices. This same fact likewise explains the division of the system into centres and periphery. However these fruits were distributed in ternally in the centres during those earlier days o f capitalism, the growth o f global demand has concentrated in them , along with the investment necessary to meet it. And therein also lay the source o f the succession of technical innovations which characterized the system. T h is, th en , is an oth er im portant conse quence of the phenomenon of the surplus. The concept of periphery could hardly find a place in the conventional theories that have omitted this phenom enon. This is why the prim ary-producer countries rem ained on the sidelines of industrialization. T h e centres had no interest in investing in them, except in the development of exportable primary production and its allied activities.
Why did they not invest, in view of the advan tage o f cheap labour in the periphery? The econom ic fragm entation o f the latter has had its effect on this. In my view, however, the di versification o f demand which is developing in the centres has been the major factor. We have explained this phenomenon and it calls for fur ther emphasis. As technical progress increases the quantity of goods and raises income, particularly in the m ore privileged social groups, a large part o f dem and is not directed to these same goods owing to a trend towards saturation, but rather to new forms o f goods or different goods resulting from other technological innovations which be com e m ore and m ore im portant in the course of development. And the capital accumulation de riving from the surplus, as well as the labour force, follows the impetus of this dynamic. Thus the logic of the system itself was giving the cen tres a dominant role.
As the periphery was left on the fringe of technical progress, it could not participate in this diversification o f production. T he diversified goods came to it in accordance with the dominant precept o f the international division of labour, i.e., in exchange for primary exports.
It was a case of appendicular development. Thus there was no global expansion of capitalism but only a partial and asymmetrical growth. That alluring image of worldwide capitalist expansion and its progressive social penetration did not materialize. And industrialization did not come spontaneously but at the decision of the periph ery itself, taken especially from the time of the great world depression of the 1930s, in order to combat the adverse consequences of the crisis. This new stage was increasingly inspired by im itation of the ways of life in the centres and of their institutions.
Appendicular development has since then been giving way to what we might call the dawn of the integral developm ent o f the periphery. Meanwhile, the centres were reinforcing their economic and technological superiority. So the periphery had to resort to protection in order to industrialize. It was a protection improvised and abusive o f the main but, all in all, it enabled the periphery to grow m ore rapidly than at the generally slow rate of its primary exports.
In the adverse conditions, first of the Great Depression and later o f the Second World War, there could be no thought of exporting man ufactures to the centres: industrialization had necessarily to be based on import substitution for the domestic market. This was followed by some degree of inertia until the spectacular rates of development of the centres up to the middle of the 1970s, and incentive measures in some pe ripheral countries, gave a start to the export of manufactures.
Thus, little by little, the passivity which had characterized the periphery in the capitalism of the past began to disappear. But in the centres, even in their long years of prosperity, there was no general policy favourable to this new form of international division of labour which differed from the earlier schemes. T h ere was no clear-cut response to the periphery's insistent pleas for better treatm ent for its exports of manufactures. T h e periphery was in fact excluded, save in minor respects, from the great liberalizing move m ent which occurred at that time among the centres.
Despite the substantial changes which are thus taking place, concepts wholly correspond ing to appendicular development linger on in the centres. Some years ago it seemed as though for m er ways of thinking would undergo a degree of modification, but now we are witnessing certain regressive manifestations, especially in the Uni ted States, where we have recently seen a vig orous resurgence o f economic liberalism.
In those early days, prompted by their own convenience, the centres were not anxious for capitalism to penetrate the periphery beyond its appendicular role. This also suited the interests of the dom inant groups in the periphery. There was, indeed, a coincidence of interests; and great masses o f the population, especially in the rural areas, were relegated to a position of exclusion from development.
A ccording to these concepts formulated in the ce n tre s, the perip h ery should be u n re servedly open to the international economy, and this called for strict observance of the princi ples of the international division of labour, with ou t artificial measures ham pering the opera tion o f economic laws; and it should likewise be unconditionally open to foreign capital.
While these principles o f the international division o f labour increasingly strengthened the econom ic linkage am ong the centres, the periph ery rem ained economically fragmented outside this unifying process. This fragmentation, the openness to trade and finance, and the growing econom ic and technological superiority of the centres, were strong pillars supporting the hege mony o f the centres, particularly that of the lead ing dynamic centre o f the time.
T hese rem arks are not prompted by a mere u rge to probe into the past which would be irrelevant to the purpose o f these pages. T hat is not so; the fact is that these concepts o f appen dicular development represent in my view the background o f certain attitudes well-known at the present time. In these days o f headlong ad vance in service techniques we are recommended to open up to them, and also to imports of goods in which these technical advances are displayed. T h ere is a renewed attack on import substitution. And at the same time emphasis is laid on the advantages for our development of free foreign investment through the efficient channel of the transnational corporations.
We have repeatedly maintained in e c l a c that import substitution is not a doctrinaire pref erence but a response to the consequences of the time-lag in industrialization and to the abovem en tion ed econom ic and technological su periority o f the centres.
Innovations diversifying goods and services
It is impossible to understand the exclusion of the periphery from the liberalizing movement in process in the centres without taking into account the technological innovations which give great impetus to diversification. Liberalization was in the last analysis the result of these innovations carried out in the main by the transnational corporations and of the dominant role they play in the trade o f the centres.
T h e increase in productivity and in the sur plus enabled them to shift capital and labour from the activities where the growth of demand was relatively slow to those benefiting by the in novations in question.
T rad e was stimulated by shifts in demand rather than by a fall in prices. Prices fall mainly in the case o f goods for which demand is weakened by shifts to new forms or new goods: it is a re sidual decline.
Demand for diversified goods also tends to accelerate in the ever more imitative capitalism of the periphery. But in contrast with this, produc tion o f these goods, owing to the time-lag in in dustrialization, is continually overtaken by the growth o f demand. So this latter has to be satis fied by imports, whose rate of growth exceeds that o f prim ary exports, save in exceptional cases.
The trend towards external disequilibrium
T hus to the trend towards internal dynamic dis equilibrium is added that of external dynamic disequilibrium. T h e periphery attempts to cor rect it by the export o f manufactures. But the centres are reluctant to accept them freely.
In fact, a new phenomenon is emerging on the international plane, since peripheral com petition, contrary to what is happening internally in the centres, is characterized not so much by diversification of goods as by the fall in their prices, since they are precisely those goods for which dem and tends to grow relatively slowly in the centres; and this gives rise to the aforesaid new unprecedented phenomenon, namely, the incipient external vulnerability of the surplus in the centres. Although the unemployment arising from peripheral competition is not excessive, it is ad d ed to th at stem m in g from the internal dynamic disequilibrium, and the centres defend themselves with measures restricting imports, thus warding o ff a fall in prices adverse to the growth of the surplus.
Consider what all this means. T h e internal dynamic disequilibrium, as we have tried to show above, leads inevitably to a new type of inflation ; and the m onetary authority has no other instru m ent available fo r com bating it than credit restriction. W e already know that the results of this are counterproductive in that they cause a considerable waste of productive resources. All in all, the m onetary instrument is very far from correcting the factors responsible for structural disequilibrium. At the same time, the restrictions which h am per the imports of the periphery mean that the reciprocal advantages of trading industrial goods which are technologically simple for others produced with spearhead technology are lost, to the detrim ent of the rate of develop m ent o f centres and periphery.
This is what was thought some time ago when the transnational corporations thrust their ways into the industrialization of the periphery. Dur ing those long years of prosperity in the centres, it was assumed that the transnationals would play a very im portant part in the internationalization o f production, through the development of new patterns o f industrial trade, thanks to which the periphery would be able to counteract its ex ternal disequilibrium. But this has not happened, since although the transnational enterprises play a major role in peripheral industrialization and in the reciprocal trade of peripheral countries, it is no less true that through the very nature of their technological innovations concentrated in the centrés, they do not contribute substantially to the penetration o f peripheral imports into the said centres.
The external vulnerability o f the surplus T he external vulnerability of the surplus of the centres is not something that can be analysed outside the context of their global development. We have seen how a shift o f demand is brought about by the diversifying innovations of technol ogy. T he diversification of demand could not take place without the growth of income arising from the growth of productivity and the forma tion of the surplus, which is the main source of capital accumulation to meet these changes in demand. T he more intensive this dynamic phe nomenon, the greater are the possibilities of dis placement of the surplus of those industries where the growth of demand is relatively slow. Now, the vulnerability o f the surplus is occurring in the centres because of their internal dynamic disequilibrium and is also beginning to o ccu r through peripheral com petition. This makes an upward shift more difficult and leads to the restriction o f imports o f peripheral origin.
This does not mean that if the rate of de velopment o f the centres were high external vul nerability would be unimportant. I am inclined to believe that this is not the case. In the boom years, when important centres satisfied part of their high demand for labour through foreign immigration, they still refrained from liberal izing their imports of manufactures.
It is not only a question of political pressures opposed to liberalization. Consider for a moment that the dynamics of the system is basically sus tained by the grow th o f the surplus. Fu n damentally, defence of the surplus runs counter to liberalization, and avails itself, as we already know, o f all sorts of restrictive measures.
It might be argued, however, that cases also occu r o f internal competition. Internally the re d u ctio n o f the surplus in the industries affected is offset by its increase in those compet ing successfully. T he global surplus still main tains its capacity for accumulation within a single country. On the other hand, in the case of ex ternal competition, the increase in the surplus occurs in the periphery while its decline takes place in the centres.
T h e concept implicit in the conventional argum ents, according to which technical prog ress results in a fall in prices and accumulation depends on the movement of interest rates, hind ers the elucidation o f these phenomena. Its is o fte n said in the cen tres that the activities affected by peripheral competition must defend themselves by technical innovations which reduce their costs. Quite right. But it must be considered whether these activities are going to continue producing the same goods or whether they in tend to employ their surplus in diversification. So this is a different case from that of peripheral competition.
.The agricultural surplus and its vulnerability
This last consideration leads me to deal with the very im portant problem created by technical in novations in agriculture. There the possibilities oí diversification of goods are extremely limited, particularly when the innovations are extended in one form or another to the whole sphere of production. Land cannot be shifted like capital to the production of diversified gòods.
Hence inno vations which increase the volume of production beyond the absorption capacity of demand bring with them a fall in prices owing to the relatively low elasticity which characterizes these goods. T h e fruits o f technical progress thus tend to be transferred to the consumers, often leaving the agricultural producers in a precarious situation. This fact explains the interventionist mea sures o f the State in major countries. Hence in the United States there have been attempts for a long time past to curb the fall in agricultural
prices through various measures restricting pro duction of exportable goods or imports of goods subject to external competition. Much the same thing happens in the European Economic Com munity. And when the safeguards are not suf ficient, recourse is had to dumping excess sup plies at any price on the international market.
This happens even in periods in which the excellence o f market laws is being preached, es pecially when the periphery advocates the de sirability o f agreements on primary products to correct o r mitigate the deterioration in the terms of trade.
I always rem em ber, because of its intrinsic significance, the recommendation made to us by one of the most eminent experts of the United States when we began to maintain in e c l a c that industrialization was an inevitable requisite of development. If you want to develop, he told us, do your utmost to introduce technical advances into primary production. But how can we employ the redundant labour force which the increase in productivity brings with it? How can we prevent, or at least minimize, the deterioration aforesaid? Industrial protection -moderate, of coursewould have the virtue o f shifting agricultural investm ent into industry and other activities to achieve this objective. In reality, it was a question of different in terests. W hat interested and continues to interest the centres is a fall in the prices of the primary products they import. This assertion might seem to contradict what we have said in this same sec tion about peripheral competition. T h e con tradiction is only apparent, since a fall in the prices o f primary products enlarges the surplus of the centres while a fall in the price of man ufactures diminishes it.
This leads me to insist, at the risk of tedium, on the importance o f including the surplus as one of the key factors in the internal and in ternational sphere. It has cost me an effort to discard them after having convinced myself, through observation of real phenom ena, that the evolution of the system inevitably leads to disequilibrium: to internal dynamic disequilibrium, both in the centres and in the periphery, and to disequilibrium in the relations between the two.
This never was -and still is not-the view of the neoclassical theorists, because they circum scribe the market to the positive elements men tioned above and to the significance of the price system. But they overlook, in contrast, the action o f o th e r fa c to rs resp on sib le fo r such disequilibria, which remove the market farther and farther from the neoclassical model.
The most significant differences
I devote this sub-section to analysing the divorce between the aforesaid theories and reality, be ginning by presenting the main differences be tw e e n n e o c la s s ic a l th in k in g and th e real functioning o f the system which I have tried to interpret in the foregoing pages.
A ccording to neoclassical arguments, the fruits of technical progress are distributed social ly by virtue of the interplay of competition. I contend that a large part of these fruits is re tained in the hands of the owners of the means of production in the form of surplus. T he surplus is sustained, therefore, by social inequality.
T fulfilment of this role calls, on the one hand, for a  passive labour force and a laissez-faire State, and,  on the other, requires that a high This crisis is outside the scope of the neoclas sical theories, which say nothing of the social structure and its mutations. They also omit from their arguments the contradictions of technolo gy: the ecological deterioration and the popula tion growth resulting from scientific and tech nological progress. For the neoclassicists all these are exogenous phenomena which need not sully the doctrinal purity of their lucubrations. It is a fact that Malthus pointed out at the beginning of the nineteenth century the potential conflict be tween the growth rate of the population and the limited resources of the system. But this phe nomenon also was left out of the theories of general equilibrium constructed by the neoclassi cists decades later. They recognize now, howev er, the necessity of regulating population growth -but not the need to regulate the system! From another standpoint, the neoclassical theories assume the spontaneous expansion of capitalism throughout the world. But this is con trary to fact. T he primary-producer countries were left on the sidelines of industrialization in the earlier days o f capitalism. Their development was essentially appendicular to that of the cen tres.
h e surplus has a great dynamic role, since it is the prim ordial source o f the reproductive capital accumulation which multiplies employ m ent, productivity and income. T he complete
According to the theories in question, in dustrialization must be spontaneous and not achieved artificially by means of protection. But the crises in the centres forced the periphery to d eviate fro m m ark et laws and to seek in dustrialization. In this way their integral de velopment began to evolve.
Thanks to its deliberate industrialization the periphery has with the passage of time become competitive in a wide range o f goods. But the centres object to accepting market laws on the international plane and diverge from them by applying all kinds o f restrictions to imports from the p erip h ery . T h ey p reach ed com parative advantages when the periphery had no indus tries. And now that it has them they ignore them.
W hen all is said and done, the evolution of the system, through structural change and the contradictions o f technology, is far from condu cing the best utilization o f productive resources, as the neoclassical theories maintain.
Incidentally, the neoclassical economists also overlook the time factor in the production pro cess and therefore do not grasp the important phenom enon o f retention of the structural sur plus.
They assumed implicitly that "supply creates its own dem and", that is, that the creation of incom e coincides with the production of the corresponding goods. They did not perceive that dem and comes from the income generated in the process o f production of future goods and not in that of the current supply, this being a fact o f m ajor importance.
The fr e e play o f market laws T h e ir rem o te n e ss from reality definitively accounts for the impotence of the neoclassical theories in face o f the system's trends towards disequilibrium. T o tackle internal disequilibrium they resort to m onetary restriction which, besides involving a great waste of productive resources, does not remoVe the basic factors which provoke it and exposes the system to its reappearance. And as regards external disequilibrium, when the periphery attempts to correct it by adding its exports of manufactures to primary products, the centres have recourse to all kinds of pro tectionist m easures to prevent external vul nerability o f the surplus, at the cost of the com parative advantages o f trade.
It is really paradoxical that, despite the di vorce between theory and reality, they continue preaching the virtues of the free play of the m ar ket, and contending that market laws lead to a better allocation o f productive resources. Better for whom? If the reference is to the social groups structurally favoured in the distribution of the fruits of technical progress, the allocation would be correct. But in the case o f the less privileged groups and the lower strata relegated to the bot tom of the social structure, it is very far from being so.
Again, if it is a question o f the centres, the allocation o f resources would be correct for them from the global standpoint. But if we consider the periphery, which the free play o f market laws had left on the sidelines o f industrialization: could it be said that the free play of the market would bring with it the best allocation of re sources from the international point of view?
This problem of exclusion had no chance of b ein g reso lv ed w ith ou t the d elib erate in dustrialization of the periphery.
T he centres opposed the protection through which the periphery gave decisive impetus to the industrializing process. They maintained that in the play o f market forces the correct solution was to reduce wages in order to offset the economic and technological superiority of the centres.
And with this in view they preached mone tary devaluation. Devaluation would bring down the prices o f the primary products which were now competitive. This solution was unacceptable to the periphery since in that way it would trans fer to the exterior at least a part of the fruits of technical progress; but it was highly desirable for the centres, since a fall in commodity prices would expand their surplus.
From its earliest days e c l a c set itself to clarify these problems and affirmed the economic jus tifiability of protection within certain limits, al ways provided that its global cost was lower than the loss of export earnings. Within these limits, protection would make it possible to raise the rate of internal development.
In this m atter there is a basic problem for the centres too. T h e periphery has only just begun to export manufactures, thanks to the incorpora tion o f technologies from the centres and to low er wages. And as it makes headway in its in dustrialization, its exports will be able to enter progressively upon increasingly advanced lines of technology. Thus the centres are confronted with a serious dilemma. If they continue to im pose unilateral restrictive measures, they lose or curtail the comparative advantages o f trade. And if they reduce wages, taking indirect advantage o f devaluation, this will obviously result in the transfer to the exterior of part of the productivity o f their own export activities.
This would not be a sporadic occurrence, but production take what is not their due. Strictly speaking, the surplus represents an important part o f the fruits of technical progress, which in its turn derives from scientific advances. If we had to assign them by right, going back through time to the long series of scientists and tech nological innovators, we should be confronted with a problem impossible to solve scientifically. T h ere is no scientific solution. The solution is basically ethical: the surplus belongs to society as a whole and must be used in accordance with ethical principles.
It is essential that this distribution, guided by ethical principles, should be dynamic and not statically frittered away. Thus, for technical prog ress to pen etrate ever m ore deeply into the structure o f society, extending its fruits to the whole community, a sufficient part of these fruits must be devoted to the accumulation of repro ductive capital. Hence equitable distribution and accumulation form an integral part of the ethic o f development. And to comply with it there is a need for rationality, that is, a rationality linked to the attainm ent o f ethical objectives.
T he macroeconomic regulation o f the surplus T hese ethical objectives could not be achieved through the play o f market forces but only by the regulation o f the surplus and its social use.
In what does this regulation consist? We must start from this initial concept: the market is not effective in determining the global part of the surplus which has to be devoted to expenditure a n d re p r o d u c tiv e a ccu m u la tio n . W e have already explained elsewhere how the private and social expenditure o f the labour force and the civil and military expenditure of the State are superimposed on the expenditure of the priv ileged social g ro u p s; and we have likewise argued that there are no spontaneous mecha nisms within the market which will ensure the compatibility o f these different expenditures with one another and as a whole, or the volume to be devoted to reproductive accumulation. These com partm ents o f expenditure could be justified as separate items, but not as a whole, if the rate of the necessary accumulation is taken into account.
A rate o f expenditures which debilitates that o f accumulation inevitably compels their reduc tion to a lower level than would have been the case if they had grown spontaneously. But the reduction does not equitably affect all the social groups but falls on the weakest parts of the system.
It is essential for the two elements to be macroeconomically regulated if they are to be dynam ically compatible. This is a primordial requisite o f development.
The social efficacy o f capitalism
This tendency to dynamic disequilibrium did not occur in those early days of capitalism to which we have referred elsewhere. Does this mean that the above-mentioned theories were at that time consonant with the reality of capitalist develop ment? This would be a serious theoretical error. Certainly there had been no crisis like that of the present time, apart from the cyclical crises. I say this because in those days, just as now, one of the basic assumptions of the theory had not been fulfilled, namely, social dissemination through a fall in prices correlative to the increase in pro ductivity, inasmuch as it was not transferred to the labour force: it remained in the form of sur plus. But even in those times the market could not ensure p er se the social efficacy of capitalism throughout the whole context of the system, i.e., a deeper and deeper penetration of technique into the stru ctu re o f society thanks to the accumulation o f the surplus. This depended fun damentally on the degree of austerity of the sys tem, that is, upon an essentially cultural phe nomenon.
It is conceivable, however, that in an austere form of capitalism too a crisis of accumulation could supervene, even given a passive labour force and a laissez-faire State, or, in other words, even if the essential conditions of the neoclassical paradigm were present. T he crisis would result from progressive euthanasia of the surplus.
In fact, the higher the rate of accumulation, the m ore intensive would be the shift of labour from lower to higher technical levels. And as the proportion o f the form er gradually declined and the heterogeneity o f the structure was thus pro g r e s s iv e ly c o r r e c t e d , t h e r e w ou ld be a spontaneous increase in the capacity o f the labour force to raise its pay in correlation with the increm ent in productivity through the play of market forces itself, even in the absence of redis-tributive power. And as the surplus is the part of this productivity which is not transferred to the labour force, the paradoxical outcome would be a weakening o f the rate of accumulation itself and transform ation o f the process would once again become indispensable.
If I digress for a moment from this hypoth esis it is in ord er to reinforce a conclusion to which I attach great importance. I have repeat edly said that the dynamics of the system is based on the surplus, which is a clear expression of social inequity in the distribution of the fruits of technical progress. In the course of democratiza tion, the trade-union and political power of the labour force endeavours to mitigate this inequity and thereby helps to make the surplus vulner able, as does also the evolution of the State. The results o f these phenomena lead to the crisis of accumulation. And I have just noted likewise that, with the passage of time, the austerity of the system could also culminate in a crisis of the accumulation process, if we were to carry theore tical reasoning to an extrem e by ignoring structu ral change and the contradictions of technology. W hat does this theoretical conclusion sig nify? It signifies that the dynamics of the system based on the surplus constitutes a historical category in capitalist development and this catego ry in one way or another ends in crisis. It is a h isto rica l c a te g o ry th a t has not been su r mounted. T h e system has no spontaneous formulas for resolving this crisis. T he crisis has to be resolved through the rational transformation of the pro cess o f accumulation and income distribution. It is im perative, then, to enter upon a new historical category if the system is to preserve and increase its capacity for human welfare, both in the cen tres and above all in peripheral capitalism.
Theories and interests
I have contended on m ore than one occasion that the persistence of the neoclassical theories was due not only to their rigorous logic but also to their co n fo rm ity with interests o f great political weight.
In the earlier days o f capitalism the existence and enlargem ent o f the surplus was a desirable thing for the social groups. It was for the play of m arket forces -the law of supply and demand-to determine wages; and for the State to take a laissez-faire line regarding income distribution.
In the second half o f the nineteenth century, neoclassical theories had ignored the structural phenomenon of the surplus under the influence o f the dominant interests. It naturally suited those interests that there should never be any counterweight to the appropriation by the high er strata o f a large part of the fruits of technical progress.
It is not surprising that, with the progressive evolution o f the trade-union and political power o f the labour force and with the proportionate rise in State exp en d itu re, the neoclassicists should have criticized these developments as constituting a violation of market laws.
Neither is it surprising, in the light of this interpretation, that the neoclassicists advocate a monetarist policy to counter the inflationary cri sis of the system, since this ultimately means the curbing o f the trade-union power o f the labour force to the extent of forcing it to accept lower wages in face o f the resulting unemployment. This is why even governments in favour of social equity find themselves forced to pursue such a policy in o rd e r to co rre ct the dynamic dis equilibrium, since in view o f the nature of the system they have no other ways of regulation at their disposal.
Thus is shattered the illusory belief that in the course of democratization the power of the dom inant groups will ultimately be counter acted. Illusory, because sooner or later the need to give impetus to the dynamics of the system induces such governments to reestablish the sur plus, making the cost fall on the labour force, albeit unevenly. In the end, thanks to the mone tary instrument, the power of the privileged strata prevails.
In the same way the crisis o f the system leads the State to halt or curtail its social expenditure, generally in advance o f other expenditure, in cluding that of a military nature, in order to reduce or eliminate the fiscal deficit which is frequently an expression of the dynamic dis equilibrium o f the system.
It is obvious that this is an attempt to restore the passivity o f the labour force and the dis tributive unconcern of the State, without regard to the fact that this is not an arbitrary phe nomenon but the result of the appropriation of a large p art of the fruits of technical progress by the upper strata. I f considerations of equity prevailed, the labour force would have to participate more and m ore in the fruits of technical progress and in the process o f accumulation. This must inevitably be achieved at the expense not only of the consump tion o f the privileged social groups but also of the consumption aspirations of a part of the labour force, in ord er to raise capital accumulation and productivity, especially in those strata relegated to the bottom o f the social structure.
Herein lies the fundamental problem which has to be tackled in capitalism by the political art o f developm ent; despite its vigour, the crisis of the system is leading to a marked frustration, involving a regression in wages and social ser vices to a level lower than would have been attained if a regular rate of growth had been achieved.
A transform ation o f the process is required: a very difficult task which requires first of all a theoretical elucidation. Instead of the distribu tion struggle which ends in dynamic disequi librium and inflation, a social consensus will have to be reached under the aegis of the State.
Experience will show whether we shall have to pass th rou gh successive upheavals before achieving that social consensus which, inspired by equity, will rationally restore the dynamics of the system; and which will also attain this objec tive in full compatibility with the spontaneous evolution o f entrepreneurial initiative in the market. This last does not imply to overlooking the serious defects of the market, which are usually eu p h em istically r e f e rre d to as im perfections. We have come a long way from This earlier concept o f the international divi sion o f labour left great masses o f the periphery on the sidelines of development. Sooner or later the pressure of these masses and also of certain leader groups would have brought about in dustrialization; the crisis in the centres was to be responsible for speeding it up. T he fact that pro tection has been abusive and arbitrary is another matter.
Similarly, the weight of interest of activities adversely affected by, the industrial and agri cultural imports of the centres is reflected in restrictive or prohibitive measures against pe ripheral com petition, without any consensus having been reached to ensure enjoyment of the reciprocal advantages o f trade.
A global theory o f development
T h e effort to interpret this crisis of capitalism in the light of conventional theories leads to great frustrations both in thinking and in action. It calls for the formulation of a global theory of development which will integrate both centres and periphery, since they are part of a single system.
T h e view has sometimes been taken that, after devoting ourselves to analysing the pe ripheral phenomena which evolved within our own field o f vision, we conceived the odd notion o f developing a peripheral theory different from the theories elaborated in the centres. These lat ter suffered, in our view, from a false sense of universality, which gave rise to conclusions as to the praxis of our development which reality proved to be unacceptable. It must be remembered, however, that neither the theories nor the con clusions had got to the bottom of the vital process o f accumulation and its structural significance. Undoubtedly an analysis of this phenomenon could help us in formulating a global theory of development.
This global theory must go beyond purely economic aspects. It will have been noted that I do not speak of the economic system but simply o f the system. F o r the system of capitalism integrates diverse elements which could not be omitted from a global theory. We have already m entioned that the social structure is subject to continuous mutations which go hand in hand with the penetration of technology and that this latter presents increasing contradictions. A glob al theory could hardly be confined within the arb itrary fram ew ork o f an econom ic theory when reality embraces at one and the same time technical, economic, social, cultural and political elements all interlinked by relations of mutual dependence. In the course of the mutations of the social structure there are also changes in pow er relations, which intervene both in the initial appropriation of the fruits of technical progress and in their subsequent redistribution. That the play o f th ese relatio n s exte n d s to the in ternational field is implicit in our reference to the hegemony o f the centres over the periphery, es pecially that o f the leading dynamic centre of capitalism. We shall deal with this in the next section.
V
Concluding remarks
Inflation in the periphery an d its political significance
Never until now had the Latin American periph ery experienced such a combination of factors p reju d icial to its d evelop m en t. T h e conse quences of an over-protracted international cri sis aggravate and complicate the internal crisis of our countries.
All of them, in varying degree, are hard beset by inflation. And this is certainly not a merely m onetary phenom enon, as we have tried to bring out in the present pages. It derives from factors operating deep in the heart of society and tearing it apart. It is there that the structural conse quences o f the evolution of technolog) and its contradictions combine to take effect.
T h e laissez-faire State and the passive labour force are things of the past. Laissez-faire as re gards income redistribution, but not with respect to the original distribution of the fruits of tech nical progress, inasmuch as the State depended on a political power which rested on the social groups benefiting by the appropriation of those fruits, mainly in the form of economic surplus.
Today these groups are confronted by oth ers whose growing power is fostered by the de mocratization process. These groups appeared to be carrying m ore and m ore weight in the struggle for redistribution. But this development caused a gradual erosion of the political power on which the State is based, since the said groups, in the course o f a redistribution struggle, tend to override the State. T h e State is not showing abil ity to dominate them and channel distribution and the capital accumulation process.
Faced with the impotence of the State and the erosion o f political power, the system inevi tably develops a trend towards exacerbation of the inflation spiral. And the attempts to contain it are short-lived as well as being counterproduc tive. For the only instrument remaining to the State is anachronistic, depressive and regressive: i.e., the monetary instrument. W hat is happening to the State is really para doxical. It is tending towards hypertrophy, with manifold responsibilities militating against its own efficacy; and with a proliferation o f in terventions which undermine the economic free dom o f enterprises and individuals and in creasingly incapacitate the State itself from fulfilling the role o f supreme regulator that the market fails to perform.
T h e solution of this grave problem is not to be sought only in institutional changes which will promote the correct functioning of the democrat ic process and the restoration of that political power on which the State must be based. This is important, but it is not all. T here is also an in escapable need to transform with a strong sense of social equity, the processes o f appropriation of the fruits of technical progress, of their distribu tion and of the capital accumulation which will give vigorous impetus to economic development.
It will not be possible to suppress the growing diversity of interests which the changes in the social structure bring in their train. But it is im perative to introduce concord and discipline into the distribution struggle through a social con sensus which will restore the political power of the State and bestow on it the aforesaid regulat ing function.
T h e time has come for a great synthesis be tween this regulating function of the State and the play o f market forces, in which the economic freedom o f enterprises and consumers can be exercised with a minimum of obstruction.
A very arduous, intricate and complicated task. It must be preceded by a major effort of enlightenm ent and persuasion, by a dialogue free o f dogmatic preconceptions. But this re quires time and purposeful perseverance.
In the meantime there are immediate solu tions to be undertaken. T h at social consensus which must com e sooner or later should be ini tiated without delay through an income policy which, while guiding the system on the road to equity, encourages the participation (and also the responsibility), of the labour force in the task of reproductive accumulation. This calls for the prior recovery of the surplus, especially where it has suffered severely from inflation. T here will have to be fiscal discipline combined with wage restraint in ord er to achieve the said recovery of the surplus with a view to promoting reproduc tive accumulation.
And here there arises the need for a decision o f great economic and social importance. Will accumulation rem ain solely in the hands of the hitherto advantaged social groups, or will it also be progressively shared by the broad social strata, which are compelled -at least momentarily-to rein in their aspirations?
It is com m on knowledge that some time ago IM F unilaterally established a régime of con ditionality which is disquieting to all of us and which is apt to be inspired by dogmatic principles which are not in keeping with the requirements o f peripheral development. At one time or an other the Fund has mentioned the need for an income policy. It is lamentable, however, that despite its great experience it has not worked out such a policy and submitted it to debate in the appropriate fora. It has delayed doing so, per haps because it continues to regard peripheral inflation as a m onetary problem, without prob ing into its deep-lying structural origin, that is, into the problems of the system's dynamic dis equilibrium.
T h e other problem which we have examined in this article is the trend towards external dynamic disequilibrium in the development of the periphery. T he conventional economists of the centres frequently continue to deny the ex istence o f such a trend, influenced as they are by the concept o f a system which makes for general equilibrium on the international plane as well.
T h e ideas of these thinkers, as those of their counterparts in the peripheral countries, are strongly reminiscent of those concepts which were dominant in the days of the appendicular development of the periphery. T he doors had to be opened wide to foreign capital and no (re putedly artificial) measures were to be taken to prom ote industrialization.
It was then that a concept arose which, with out being explicit, was dominant in the days of appendicular development and still remains in force, as has been explained in another chapter. T h e centres were interested in peripheral de velopment only in so far as it served their own interests. This is the explanation of the opposition to peripheral industrialization. T he idea was anathema to the centres at the very outset, es pecially w here im port substitution was con cerned, as we also remarked in the appropriate context. And on finally accepting industrializa tion as a fa it accompli they recommended that the accent should rather be placed on exporting manufactures. And when the periphery was able to do this, the centres, far from adopting an attitude consonant with this recommendation, added new constraints and restrictions to those which they had maintained for a long time past. This is how the matter stands today, and yet there is a tendency to return to certain earlier ways of thinking against which we should be on our guard in time, because of their great signifi cance for our countries. I refer to the turn which is apparently being taken by the foreign policy of the United States.
Significance o f the United States' new economic policy
This country is in the throes of an external dis equilibrium o f growing dimensions, originating in part in the overvaluation o f its currency; this in turn is a result o f the extraordinarily high inter est rates through which it is drawing off abun dant resources from the rest of the world in o rd er to cover part o f its fiscal deficit. T h e said overvaluation vigorously boosts United States imports and discourages its ex ports. But for one reason or another it chooses to co rre c t the resulting extern al deficit not by means o f fiscal or monetary adjustments but through direct measures concerning trade.
Its aim is to encourage exports, particularly o f technologically advanced goods, and likewise o f services in which technical progress has also been highly intensive. And it underlines, at the same time, its intent to carry out this policy on bases o f re cip ro city , which means that the liberalization of trade with the rest of the world in respect of those goods and services exported by the United States should be accompanied by the liberalization o f its imports from these countries.
T h ere is talk at the moment about a new round of international negotiations on liberaliza tion similar to those which have been so success ful in the past in the trade of the centres.
T o embark on this subject would be to go beyond the scope of these reflections. I should merely like to refer to the significance of this new policy for the periphery. But first it would be well to recall the terms in which the problem of its trade with the centres is posed.
In this trade there is a persistent trend to wards external imbalance which we have ex plained elsewhere: a structural trend different from the phenom enon which is now occurring in the United States.
T h ere are only two ways o f correcting this imbalance, namely, an export expansion and im port substitution. T h e pace of the substitution does not depend on a doctrinaire preference but on the degree of receptivity of the centres to peripheral exports: this cannot be repeated too often.
It would seem obvious that if the periphery com p lied with the U nited States' plan and o p e n e d its m a rk e ts u n re se rv e d ly to tech nologically advanced goods and services, in addi tion to others, the trend towards external im balance would be accentuated. In this case, in accordance with the principle o f reciprocity, the United States and the other centres taking part in these international negotiations would have to liberalize imports from the periphery. In the rounds mentioned above, impressive reductions in tariffs were achieved which gave powerful im petus to trade between the centres, especially in goods deriving from technological innovations. T h e periphery, lacking such goods owing to the time-lag in its industrialization, was practically excluded from the liberalizing measures.
Would the centres now be disposed to do away with the restrictions which for some time now have been obstructing imports of tech nologically less advanced goods from the periph ery?
It is very doubtful that this would occur. Not only recently but for a long time now the centres have put obstacles in the way of imports from the periphery, even in periods when unemployment was low. In reality, the idea was to safeguard the surplus of the activities affected by lower import prices. Although this practice is at present only moderately applied, it could reach major pro portions, especially if respect for multilateral principles extended liberalization to the other developing regions. W hat is more, as long as the centres cannot achieve a substantial reduction in their cu rren t unem ploym ent, such a radical change o f attitude is scarcely conceivable.
How could this problem be solved, or at least alleviated, without a radical attack on the dynam ic disequilibrium in the centres which produces structural unemployment? W ould the centres really be prepared to accept peripheral competition of this kind? Or will they rather seek intermediate formulas to regulate this competition in accordance, at best, with a régime agreed upon with the periphery to prom ote the regular growth o f imports without increasing unemployment, unless in a measure that could be absorbed?
While acknowledging the impulse that such a process might give to exports of manufactures and o f some agricultural products, I am far from believing that it would be sufficient to eliminate the c u rre n t im balance and cover the everincreasing volume of imports which a rise in the ra te o f p e r ip h e r a l d e v e lo p m e n t and the liberalization o f its imports would imply. W e must shun the illusion o f assuming that to accept the liberalization o f imports of advanced goods and services desired by the centres would induce them to do their best to reciprocate in favour o f imports from the periphery. I do not believe this would happen, except in the limited m easure referred to, and, consequently, the pe riphery should continue its policy of import sub stitution.
Indeed, the intensification of this policy is an imperative requisite o f development, especially if its rate is to be increased. And the dimension it must achieve depends basically on the centres' receptivity to the goods exported by the pe ripheral countries. In other words, stimulation of the latter must be combined with progress in substitution.
A t this stage o f the industrial evolution of the peripheral countries especially of the more ad vanced am ong them, it would be essential to car ry out this substitution process in larger markets than th e national ones th rou gh production agreem ents between various countries and recip rocal trade. This also calls for new modus operandi, since those conceived a quarter of a century ago have ,had only m oderate success in achieving the positive results expected of them.
All this has to be tackled from a dynamic standpoint. Both exp ort expansion and importsubstituting industries will continue to bring with them an increase in technical and entrepreneur ial capacity which, by virtue of the surplus, will foster the development of industries with more advanced technology. In this way, the countries o f the periphery, some sooner and others later, would gradually draw nearer to the trade pat terns o f the centres.
The doctrine o f fin a n cia l openness
In addition to this opening-up o f peripheral trade, the main dynamic centre preaches finan cial openness, i.e., the elimination of all restric tion on foreign investment and the functioning o f the transnational corporations.
It must not be overlooked that the trans nationals, in co-operation with the State and pri vate enterprise, could contribute to development in accordance with new rules o f the game, that is, in line with a well-defined policy and with the requisites o f development.
Each peripheral country will have to decide which fields would benefit from the co-operation o f the transnationals and which should be re served for local enterprise, either because the necessary technology has already been acquired or because there would be other effective means of gaining it.
T o yield to the doctrine of openness, above all in times o f crisis like the present, would not only have adverse consequences, both economic and political, but would also block the way to the discovery o f new formulas. Suffice it to recall that, if in the past we had given way to insistent pressures, we should not have been able to arrive at such formulas in a field as vital as petroleum.
Here also there are signs of susceptibility to the influence of ideas corresponding to the aforesaid concept of appendicular development.
In the periphery there have been great changes which call for an all-out drive towards integral development. This will require a pro gressive effort to overcom e the technical in feriority by which appendicular development was characterized.
If the doors were quite unconditionally opened wide to foreign imports and investment, this objective would be out of reach, since the technologically stronger industries of the centres would ultimately gain predominance, sapping the vigour of peripheral development.
The fundam ental coincidence o f interests
This does not concern the economy alone. These great changes are also of a political and cultural nature. T h e periphery is not isolated, but finds itself more and m ore under the influence of the political and cultural evolution o f the centres and o f the mass communication media in the in ternational sphere. T hus the process of de mocratization, with all it entails, goes on spread ing and interest in integrated development gains a firmer footing. W e cannot turn back the clock either in rela tions with the centres or in internal development. T he traces of appendicular development implicit in the insistence on unconditional openness in trade and finance must be eliminated once and for all. T h ere was a reason for openness in trade when in the old pattern o f the international divi sion o f lab ou r com p arative advantages de termined the trading of primary products for m a n u factu res. T h e re w ere no com parative advantages in industrial goods simply because
